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Abstract 
The present research demonstrates that negotiators can act powerfully without having power. 
Researchers and practitioners advise people to obtain strong alternatives prior to negotiating to 
enhance their power. However, alternatives are not always readily available, often forcing 
negotiators to negotiate without much, or any, power. Building on research suggesting that 
subjective feelings of power and objective outcomes are disconnected and that mental simulation 
can increase individuals’ aspirations, we hypothesized that the mental imagery of a strong 
alternative could provide similar psychological benefits to having an actual alternative. Our 
studies demonstrate that imagining strong alternatives causes individuals to negotiate more 
ambitiously and provides them with a distributive advantage: negotiators reached more profitable 
agreements when they either had a strong tendency to think about better alternatives (Study 1) or 
when they were instructed to mentally simulate an attractive alternative (Studies 3-4). Mediation 
analyses suggest that mental simulation boosts performance because it increases negotiators’ 
aspirations which translate into more ambitious first offers (Studies 2-4), but only when the 
simulated alternative is attractive (Study 2b). Our findings further show that mental simulations 
are only beneficial when there is sufficient room in the negotiation to reach a profitable 
agreement, but backfire in settings where negotiators’ positions are difficult to reconcile (Study 
5). An internal meta-analysis of the file-drawer produces effect size estimates free of publication 
bias and demonstrates the robustness of the effect. Our findings contribute to research on social 
power, negotiations, and mental simulation.  
 
Keywords: negotiation, alternatives, power, ambition, first offer, mental simulation, impasse
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Social conflict is ubiquitous. One of the most common ways to resolve conflict is through 
negotiation. Negotiation can be defined as a discussion aimed at resolving a perceived divergence 
of interests between two or more parties (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), which can include 
individuals, groups, organizations, or even countries. For example, individuals negotiate their job 
offers, groups divide a pool of resources, organizations negotiate mergers and acquisitions, and 
countries negotiate trade agreements or peace accords. Negotiating parties are usually interested 
in securing profitable agreements. To help negotiators achieve their goals, scholars and 
practitioners recommend to identify strong alternatives before the negotiation because 
alternatives provide the necessary power to ask for more (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2011; 
Thompson, 2011). Even negotiators themselves prefer having strong alternatives over weak or no 
alternatives (see Schaerer, Swaab, & Galinsky, 2015). The notion that having alternatives is 
beneficial is also supported by empirical evidence: Decades of negotiations research shows that 
negotiators with strong alternatives often secure more profitable agreements than negotiators with 
weak or no alternatives (e.g., Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994; 
Thompson, 2011; Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). 
Despite the benefits of strong alternatives, negotiators are not always able to obtain 
outside options. In fact, more often than not, negotiators have no alternative at all. For example, 
60% of psychology students graduate college without any job offer (NACE, 2014) and many 
business school graduates need to negotiate jobs in the absence of an outside offer (GMAC, 
2015; Grant, Nurmohamed, Ashford, & Dekas, 2011). This poses significant challenges for 
negotiators as the absence of alternatives lowers their aspirations (Wong, 2014), feelings of 
confidence (Schaerer et al., 2015), and willingness to negotiate (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 
2007) – all of which are critical for achieving a profitable agreement. Unfortunately, little 
research has investigated how negotiators can overcome the lack of a strong alternative. 
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Examining this question would address an important theoretical gap in the social power literature, 
which has focused almost exclusively on the benefits of powerfulness at the expense of 
understanding whether and how the powerless can compete successfully (Schaerer, du Plessis, 
Yap, & Thau, 2016a). An answer to this question would also be of practical importance because a 
lack of alternatives causes negotiators to settle on suboptimal outcomes (Pinkley et al., 1994; 
Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). For example, a job candidate who does not have an alternative offer 
(compared to a candidate who has an alternative) may be more likely to think that negotiating a 
job offer is inappropriate, even if doing so could make both candidate and recruiter better off.  
Negotiators who lack alternatives typically fail to secure profitable agreements because 
they do not set sufficiently high aspirations, preventing them from making ambitious offers 
(Galinsky, Ku, & Mussweiler, 2009; Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002). This implies that if negotiators 
without alternatives were able to set more ambitious aspirations, they could demand more from 
their opponent and overcome the disadvantages of being powerless. The present research 
investigates a mechanism that could motivate powerless negotiators to do so: the mental 
simulation of having an attractive alternative. We propose that the mental simulation of an 
attractive alternative causes negotiators to set higher aspirations when they lack an actual 
alternative. Higher aspirations, in turn, motivate negotiators to demand more from their opponent 
and improve their final agreements. Thus, negotiators may not necessarily need to possess actual 
alternatives to benefit from the psychological advantages these alternatives typically offer.  
The current studies contribute to the literatures of negotiation, mental simulation, and 
social power in important ways. First, the majority of power research has focused on the 
consequences of being high in power (Schaerer et al., 2016a), at the expense of understanding 
powerlessness. The current research advances the psychology of powerlessness by proposing a 
novel mechanism through which those in a seemingly disadvantaged position can perform more 
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effectively in competitive interactions. Second, while past research has assumed that identifying 
alternatives is the best way to strengthen one’s power to gain a distributive advantage (see 
Thompson et al., 2010), the present research suggests that the mental simulation of an alternative 
can provide negotiators with a similar psychological advantage as the possession of an actual 
alternative. Third, the present research extends the functional view of mental simulation (Epstude 
& Roese, 2008; Roese, 1994), by demonstrating that mental simulation can lead to a distributive 
advantage in competitive social interactions, establishing negotiator aspiration and first offer size 
as a behavioral mechanism of mental simulation, and identifying relevant boundary conditions of 
the effect.  
The Power of Alternatives 
The negotiation literature suggests that the most important source of power is a 
negotiator’s alternatives and that negotiators with no alternatives will find it hard, if not 
impossible, to achieve profitable agreements because powerlessness undermines their aspirations. 
Negotiation power is typically conceptualized as the quality of a negotiator’s alternative, or 
BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, see Fisher et al., 2011). Negotiators with 
better BATNAs set higher aspirations (Pinkley et al., 1994; Wong, 2014), demand more from 
their opponent (De Dreu, 1995), and behave more agentically to achieve their goals (Magee et al., 
2007). In addition, negotiators with better BATNAs use more threats (Lawler, 1992), experience 
competitive interactions more as a challenge than as a threat (Scheepers, de Wit, Ellemers, & 
Sassenberg, 2012), take more risk (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), claim larger shares of total 
payoffs (Komorita & Leung, 1985; Pinkley et al., 1994), and are influenced less by their 
counterparts’ emotions (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). Thus, not having a 
BATNA makes it challenging for negotiators to be ambitious and engage in behaviors that help 
them to secure profitable agreements.  
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The idea that obtaining alternatives is a precondition to negotiating ambitiously and 
securing profitable agreements is rooted in the assumption that the functional value of 
alternatives primarily lies in the power they provide. For example, alternatives can help put 
pressure on the counterpart or signal one’s worth in the marketplace (e.g., Kim, Pinkley, & 
Fragale, 2005; Pinkley, 1995; Pinkley et al., 1994). In contrast to this assumption, however, 
recent research has suggested that negotiation alternatives serve a dual role: they not only provide 
power but also act as salient anchors that influence negotiators’ decision-making (Schaerer et al., 
2015). This implies that the absence of structural power does not necessarily prevent one from 
setting high ambitions. Indeed, Schaerer and colleagues (2015) found that, despite feeling less 
powerful, negotiators without any alternative secured more profitable agreements than 
negotiators with a weak alternative. This occurred because weak alternatives served as low 
anchor values that weighed down negotiators’ aspirations and the value of their first offer. Thus, 
powerful negotiators do not always make aggressive first offers and powerless negotiators do not 
always open modestly. 
Acting Powerfully without Power 
The research reviewed above suggests that negotiators may be able to take advantage of 
the disconnect between power and ambition and behave as if they were powerful, without having 
an actual alternative. Specifically, we propose that mentally simulating an attractive alternative 
(i.e., thinking about what it would be like to have a strong alternative) should cause negotiators to 
set higher aspirations, demand more from their opponent, and in turn help them claim a larger 
piece of the negotiation pie. The idea that the mental image of an alternative causes people to set 
higher aspirations is based on mental simulation research (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Roese, 
1997). Mental simulation involves the construction of hypothetical possibilities, or 
counterfactuals, that highlight the usefulness of a particular action, which is then translated into a 
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corresponding behavioral intention and goal-directed behavior (Epstude & Roese, 2008). For 
example, students who were asked to generate hypothetical thoughts about performing better on a 
recent exam subsequently reported greater intentions to engage in performance-facilitating 
behavior for future exams (Roese, 1994). Mental simulation can even affect task performance. In 
one study, participants who imagined performing well on an anagram task expected to be more 
successful and, as a result, also performed better in a subsequent anagram task (Sherman, Skov, 
Hervitz, & Stock, 1981). Thus, the imagery of a possibility is a precursor to expectancy and 
expectancy is a precursor to reality.  
Mental simulations also play an important role in negotiations. For instance, negotiators 
who had their first offer immediately accepted (compared to those who had to negotiate) were 
less satisfied after the negotiation because they engaged in greater counterfactual thinking, mental 
simulations about “what might have been” if they made a different offer (Galinsky, Seiden, Kim, 
& Medvec, 2002). Likewise, negotiators who negotiated more (vs. fewer) issues felt worse about 
their outcome because their preoccupation with more issues generated more counterfactual 
thoughts imagining better possible outcomes (Naquin, 2003). Other research investigating the 
influence of mental simulation on negotiation outcomes has focused on learning from a 
negotiation that has already happened and on the relative performance of different types of 
counterfactuals (Kray, Galinsky, & Markman, 2009; Wong, Haselhuhn, & Kray, 2012). For 
example, Kray and colleagues (2009) found that negotiators who generated additive 
counterfactuals about a past negotiation (e.g., ‘If only I had made the first offer...”) gained a 
competitive advantage over those who generated subtractive counterfactuals (e.g., ‘If only I had 
not made the first offer....”) because the former facilitated learning. Despite these insights, it 
remains unclear whether mental simulations a) afford negotiators a distributive advantage, b) 
affects performance on an upcoming negotiation without having to rely on a salient experience 
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from a recent negotiation, c) operates through routes other than learning, and d) whether mental 
simulations also has potential downsides.  
We propose that mental simulation can improve negotiators’ performance by cognitively 
changing a negotiator’s expectations. Specifically, the link from mental simulation to expectancy 
is driven by activating a script, or knowledge, that guides the pursuit of relevant goals (Epstude & 
Roese, 2008; Roese & Olson, 1993). For example, Smallman and Roese (2009) demonstrated that 
counterfactual judgments (compared to control judgments) reduced the reaction times to respond 
to content-specific prompts, suggesting that counterfactual judgments made such knowledge 
more readily accessible. Such activated knowledge, in turn, can cause people to anchor on a goal-
relevant reference point and encourages them to pursue this goal more strongly (Chapman & 
Johnson, 1999). This process tends to be more effective when the reference points that people 
focus on are more attractive (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese, 1994).  
Thus, negotiators who generate cognitions about what it would be like to have a strong 
alternative activate information (e.g., “a strong alternative would allow me to negotiate more 
successfully”) that should translate into higher expectations (e.g., “I should be more ambitious”). 
In negotiations, such expectations are usually reflected in a negotiator’s aspiration price – the best 
outcome that a negotiator can reasonably hope to achieve (Walton & McKersie, 1965). Together, 
this research suggests that negotiators who mentally simulate a strong alternative would set 
higher aspirations than those who do not engage in mental simulation (Hypothesis 1).  
Negotiators with higher aspirations, in turn, should make more ambitious first offers. 
Aspirations can have a strong influence on how individuals approach negotiations (e.g., White & 
Neale, 1994). For example, negotiators who focus on their (high) aspiration price tend to open the 
negotiation more assertively by making higher first offers compared to those who focus on their 
(low) walkaway point (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Schaerer et al., 2015). Thus, we further 
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predicted that negotiators who mentally simulate a strong alternative would make higher first 
offers than those who do not engage in mental simulation (Hypothesis 2) and that this 
relationship is mediated by their aspirations (Hypothesis 3).  
These predictions have important implications for the remainder of the negotiation. Past 
research has established strong correlations between the value of the first offer and the final 
negotiation outcome (see Loschelder, Trötschel, Swaab, Friese, & Galinsky, 2016 for a review) 
such that more ambitious first offers result in a larger piece of the bargaining pie (Galinsky et al., 
2009). Although the first mover advantage emerges in both single and multi-issue negotiations 
(Gunia, Swaab, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2013), it is driven by how much negotiators demand 
from the distributive issues (i.e., issues for which the parties hold opposing interests and that are 
of similar importance to each party), not by how much they ask on the integrative issues (i.e., 
issues for which parties hold opposing interests of differing importance that allow trade-offs) or 
compatible issues (i.e., issues of mutual interests). Thus, negotiators who mentally simulate a 
strong alternative should claim more value from the distributive issues than those who do not 
engage in this simulation (Hypothesis 4) because they make more demanding first offers 
(Hypothesis 5).  
The Dark Side of Imaginary Alternatives 
 The idea that mental simulation can boost negotiators’ aspirations and therefore provide a 
distributive advantage hinges on a critical assumption; namely, that higher aspirations always 
enable one to claim more value. This is not uniformly true across all negotiation contexts. In 
some negotiations, parties’ walkaway-points for a particular issue do not overlap sufficiently, 
making agreement challenging, or even impossible (e.g., Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 
2008; Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008; Sinaceur, Maddux, Vasiljevic, Nückel, & Galinsky, 
2013). In these cases, high aspirations and offers may become a liability. Indeed, when the 
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bargaining zone (i.e., the distance between negotiators’ walkaway-points) for a particular issue is 
negative, setting high aspirations and making ambitious offers increases the difficulty of finding 
an agreement because negotiators are unlikely to accept offers below their walkaway-points (e.g., 
Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Thompson, 1995). Instead, negotiators have to be creative and identify 
additional integrative issues to transform negative bargaining zones on an issue into mutually 
beneficial agreements. This is less likely to happen when negotiators have very high aspirations 
and make very demanding offers that only set the parties’ positions further apart.  
The idea that mentally simulating alternatives can be detrimental in negotiations with a 
negative bargaining zone is consistent with prior research suggesting that negotiators who are too 
aspirational and too strongly focused on the outer boundaries of settlement are likely to lose sight 
of solutions that benefit themselves as well as their opponent (White & Neale, 1994). For 
example, past research showed that overly ambitious negotiators are more likely to end 
negotiations in impasses than less ambitious negotiators (e.g., Huber & Neale, 1987; Korobkin, 
2002; Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, & Thompson, 2002). Similarly, negotiators assuming the role 
of real estate agents were less likely to reach an agreement when they made aggressive versus 
moderate demands to potential tenants (Schweinsberg, Ku, Wang, & Pillutla, 2012). Thus, 
because boosting aspirations through mental simulation has the potential to intensify the 
perceived distance between the two parties’ positions, we predicted that imagining strong 
alternatives would be detrimental in integrative contexts where negotiators have to reconcile their 
seemingly incompatible preferences (Hypothesis 6). 
Overview of the Present Research 
 We test our predictions in five studies that both measured and manipulated the mental 
simulation of ood alternatives to explore their impact on different types of mixed-motive 
interactions: tasks with differing preferences and priorities (Study 1), competitive zero-sum 
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interactions (Studies 2-4), and tasks with conflicting positions that mask the compatibility of 
underlying interests (Study 5). Specifically, Study 1 validates a scale measuring the extent to 
which people imagine strong alternatives in their negotiations and correlates this with 
negotiators’ ability to claim value during an interactive, face-to-face negotiation including 
multiple issues. Study 2 examines whether actively imagining alternatives prior to the negotiation 
can lead to negotiators to make more ambitious first offers because it increases their aspirations 
(Hypotheses 1-3). Study 2 also examines whether these effects emerge when negotiators imagine 
any alternative or only when they imagine an attractive alternative. Study 3 uses a professional 
sample and an interactive email negotiation to manipulate imaging alternatives and test whether 
the effects of first offers extend to final agreements (Hypotheses 4-5). Study 4 constructively 
replicates Study 3 in a different negotiation context and establishes the external validity of the 
effects by manipulating the absence of an alternative through a sequential negotiation design. 
Finally, Study 5 examines whether the high aspirations generated by imagined alternatives 
backfire when negotiators’ positions are difficult to reconcile in an interactive, face-to-face 
negotiation (Hypothesis 6).   
Study 1: Imaginary Alternatives and Value Claiming 
 Study 1 assessed the extent to which negotiators have a tendency to simulate better 
alternatives and whether this tendency is associated with the amount of value claimed in a multi-
issue negotiation. Given the empirical evidence that demonstrates that higher aspirations help 
negotiators claim value (e.g., Freshman & Guthrie, 2009; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; 
Thompson, 1995; Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002; White & Neale, 1994), we predicted that 
negotiators who mentally simulate better alternatives would negotiate better agreements on 
distributive issues. The negotiation task in Study 1 also contained integrative issues with a 
positive bargaining zone and compatible issues. Because integrative and compatible outcomes are 
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not affected by aspirations (Huber & Neale, 1987) and first offers (Gunia et al., 2013), we did not 
expect mental simulations to affect these issues.  
Participants. 
 Participants were 91 professionals (mean age = 29.33; SD = 2.09; 31.9% female) enrolled 
in a negotiation course as part of their Master of Business Administration program. Participants 
were randomly matched with a negotiation partner at the beginning of their interactive, face-to-
face negotiation.  
Procedure. 
Once assigned to their dyad, participants either took the role of a candidate or a recruiter 
in the New Recruit negotiation (Neale, 1997). New Recruit is a multi-issue negotiation in which 
parties negotiate the terms of a new employment contract. Negotiators’ preferences were created 
by assigning points to each of eight issues and participants received a scoring system detailing the 
point structure (see Appendix A). Two issues were distributive (e.g., the candidate wanted a 
higher and the recruiter a lower salary), two issues were compatible (e.g., both parties wanted the 
job to be in San Francisco), and the remaining four issues were integrative (e.g., bonus was more 
important to the candidate and vacation time to the recruiter; as a result, both negotiators could 
benefit from a large bonus packaged with little vacation time). Negotiators did not have an 
alternative (i.e., an impasse resulted in zero points) and could negotiate a maximum of 13,200 
points. Participants were given confidential role instructions one week before the negotiation and 
were allowed 45 minutes to negotiate a deal face-to-face in individual breakout rooms. After the 
negotiation, participants reported their outcomes to the course instructor and were debriefed. 
Measures.  
Imaginary alternatives. The extent to which negotiators engaged in mental simulation of 
attractive alternatives was measured in an unrelated survey at the end of the negotiation course 
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several weeks apart from the actual study. We developed a five-item measure (see Appendix B) 
to capture this construct. Participants rated their tendency to imagine alternatives (e.g., “When I 
negotiate, I think about what it would be like to have a better offer.”) on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). A pilot study with 100 participants 
recruited from across the United States via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mean age = 33.55; SD = 
12.00; 54.0% female) confirmed that the scale was internally reliable (α = .83; M = 4.94; SD = 
1.19).  
To assess discriminant validity from other constructs that influence aspirations and 
negotiation outcomes, we analyzed how participants’ imaginary alternative score correlated with 
Sense of Power (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012), optimism (Revised Life Orientation Test; 
Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), and the Big 5 personality markers (Gosling, Rentfrow, & 
Swann, 2003). None of these constructs correlated highly with our imaginary alternatives scale 
(all rs < .13; see Table 1).  
To assess convergent validity, we examined to what extent participants’ imaginary 
alternatives score correlated with their maximization tendencies (Schwartz et al., 2002). The 
maximization scale should covary with the imaginary alternatives scale as some items of the 
maximization scale assess how satisfied people are with their current situation and/or to what 
extent they hold themselves to high standards (Nenkov, Morrin, Schwartz, Ward, & Hulland, 
2008). Indeed, there was a small correlation between the two constructs (r = .26, p = .01). To 
confirm that the imaginary alternatives scale and maximization tendencies are distinct constructs, 
we conducted an exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation. Neither the maximization 
scale (nor any of the other constructs) cross-loaded highly with the imaginary alternatives factor 
as the primary factor, or vice versa (all loadings < .46). However, all five imaginary alternatives 
items loaded highly onto a single factor (all loadings > .71). 
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********************* 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
********************* 
 
Negotiation outcome. We measured negotiators’ individual outcomes based on the total 
number of points achieved across all issues (i.e., total value claimed) as well as the points 
achieved on the distributive, integrative, and compatible issues, respectively. 
Control variables. To address potential endogeneity concerns, we also controlled for 
whether negotiators were in the buyer or seller role, their age, and their gender. To account for 
within-dyad effects and rule out concerns over non-independence of individual observations, we 
clustered negotiators in their respective dyads and controlled for it using a Generalized Estimated 
Equations (GEE) regression model with multilevel structure. 
Results  
All dyads reached an agreement. We regressed negotiators’ total value claimed on the 
extent to which they engaged in mental simulations of better alternatives. As predicted, 
negotiators who engaged more strongly in mental simulations of attractive alternatives claimed 
more value, b = .24, SE = .10, Wald(1) = 5.96, p = .015.  (Model 1, Table 2). This effect 
remained robust when we included the control variables (Model 2, Table 2).  
We then analyzed negotiators’ outcomes for each issue type. If our theorizing that 
mentally simulating alternatives boosts negotiators’ aspirations is correct, we should only find 
increased performance on the distributive issues, but not on the integrative or compatible issues 
where aspirations tend to be unrelated to individual success. This is exactly what we found. 
Negotiators’ imaginary alternatives score positively predicted value claimed on the distributive 
issues, b = .16, SE = .06, Wald(1) = 6.07, p = .014 (Model 3, Table 2), but neither predicted 
performance on the integrative issues (p = .90; Models 5-6, Table 2) nor on the compatible issues 
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(p = .15; Models 7-8, Table 2). These effects remained unchanged when we included the control 
variables (Models 4, 6, and 8, Table 2).  
 
********************* 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
********************* 
 
Discussion 
 Study 1 found that negotiators who lacked an actual alternative claimed more value from 
their negotiation counterparts the more strongly they engaged in mental simulations of attractive 
alternatives. Moreover, Study 1 found that this effect was driven by negotiators’ performance on 
the distributive issues rather than on the integrative or compatible issues. However, Study 1 did 
not manipulate the mental simulation of alternatives, leaving open the possibility of alternative 
explanations. In addition, Study 1 did not allow us to examine the underlying mechanisms 
because we could not measure aspirations and first offers. Study 2 addressed these issues by 
manipulating the mental simulation of alternatives in the absence of an alternative and examining 
its effects on negotiators’ aspirations and subsequent first offers.  
Study 2a: Manipulating Imaginary Alternatives  
 The aim of Study 2 was to a) establish a causal link between the mental imagery of strong 
alternatives and negotiators’ first offers and b) to show that this relationship is mediated by 
negotiator aspirations. 
Participants and Design 
Three hundred and six participants (mean age = 34.33; SD = 10.35; 42.8% female) were 
recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in exchange for US$.50. Participants were randomly 
assigned to a strong alternative condition, a no alternative condition, or an imaginary alternative 
condition.  
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Two participants took part twice (i.e., duplicate IP addresses), two participants failed the 
attention check, and fourteen participants reported extreme values (+/- 3SDs) for aspirations 
and/or first offers and were thus excluded from the analyses, leaving 288 participants in our final 
sample. These exclusion criteria were determined before data collection and applied consistently 
across all studies using online participants.  
Procedure and Experimental Manipulation 
Participants were instructed to sell a second-hand CD and were informed that a potential 
buyer asked them to make a first offer. Participants then received information about the 
alternative offers that they had secured or not. In the strong alternative condition, participants 
read: “You also know that another buyer has offered you $8 for the CD. Thus, if you can’t reach 
an agreement in the current negotiation, you will get $8 for the CD.” Participants in the no 
alternative condition read: “You also know that nobody else has offered you money for the CD. 
Thus, if you can’t reach an agreement in the current negotiation, you won’t get any money for the 
CD”. Participants in the imaginary alternative condition received the same instructions as those in 
the no alternative condition, but also encountered an additional page of instructions asking them 
to complete a short thought exercise. Specifically, they were told: 
Imagine yourself in a situation in which you have already secured a strong 
alternative offer from another buyer before entering the negotiation. Imagine what 
this strong alternative offer would look like, how it would feel like, and how it 
would affect your upcoming negotiation. 
Dependent Measures 
First offer and aspiration price. Following the manipulation, participants made a first 
offer to the buyer and indicated their aspiration price (i.e., the ideal price they would like to 
achieve in the negotiation).  
IMAGINARY ALTERNATIVES  17 
 
Manipulation check. To check the effectiveness of the manipulation, participants 
answered the question “While completing the task, I was instructed to imagine an alternative 
offer that I did not have” on a scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).   
Finally, participants completed an attention check developed for online studies 
(Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) and reported demographic information.  
Results 
Manipulation check. The manipulation was successful. Participants in the imaginary 
alternative condition focused more strongly on having an alternative offer that they did not have 
(M = 5.51, SD = 1.95) than those in the strong alternative condition, (M = 3.07, SD = 2.35), 
t(285) = 7.32, p < .001, and those in the no alternative condition, (M = 3.20, SD = 2.55), t(285) = 
6.97, p < .001. The latter two conditions did not differ (p = .71).  
Aspiration price. As predicted, negotiators in the imaginary alternatives condition had 
higher aspirations (M = 9.72, SD = 5.81) than those in the no alternative condition (M = 7.45, SD 
= 4.81), t(285) = 3.54, p < .001, d = .71. Those who had a strong alternative also set higher 
aspiration prices (M = 10.08, SD = 2.29) than those who had no alternative, t(285) = 3.46, p = 
.001, d = .91. The strong alternative and imaginary alternative conditions did not differ (p = .92). 
First offer. Also as predicted, negotiators in the imaginary alternatives condition made 
higher first offers (M = 11.20, SD = 6.53) than those in the no alternative condition (M = 8.65, SD 
= 5.67), t(285) = 3.44, p = .001, d = .42 (see Figure 1). Those who had a strong alternative also 
made higher first offers (M = 10.68, SD = 2.17) than those who had no alternative, t(285) = 2.75, 
p = .006, d = .47, but did not differ from those in the imaginary alternative condition (p = .49).  
 
********************* 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
********************* 
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Mediation analysis. Next, a mediation analysis tested the prediction that imagining a 
strong alternative would lead to higher first offers because negotiators had higher aspirations. 
Because the independent variable was multicategorical, we used the indicator coding 
recommended by Hayes and Preacher (2013). The indirect effect of the indicator for the 
imaginary alternatives condition (1 = imaginary alternatives condition; 0 = all other conditions) 
was tested while controlling for a second indicator (1 = strong alternatives condition; 0 = all other 
conditions).1 Negotiators’ aspiration price mediated the effect of simulating an alternative on first 
offers. A bootstrapping procedure with 5,000 resamples and a 95% bias-corrected bootstrap 
confidence interval (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) confirmed that there was a significant indirect 
effect, CI95 [.8173; 3.758] (see Figure 2). 
 
********************* 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
********************* 
 
Discussion 
Study 2a establishes that instructing negotiators to imagine attractive alternatives when 
they do not have any actual alternatives causes them to set higher aspirations and, as a result, 
make more ambitious first offers. Thus, this study demonstrates for the first time that actively 
imagining an alternative provides similar benefits to the possession of an actual alternative.  
Study 2b: Attractive vs. Unattractive Alternatives 
Study 2b extends Study 2a by examining whether thinking about any alternative (even an 
unattractive one) boosts aspiration and first offers. Although thinking about any alternative 
(attractive or not) could potentially increase confidence and competitive behavior, we argued that 
                                                          
1 There was also a significant indirect effect when the strong alternatives condition was dropped and only the no 
alternatives and the imaginary alternatives conditions were compared, CI95 [.8336; 3.797].  
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the aspiration boost of mental simulation should only emerge for attractive alternatives but not 
for unattractive ones. This notion is consistent with prior research showing that upward mental 
simulation (e.g., thinking about how things could be better) is more likely to generate goal pursuit 
than downward simulation (e.g., thinking about how things could be worse; Epstude & Roese, 
2008; Roese, 1994). Study 2b tested this assumption directly by adding a condition in which 
negotiators mentally simulated an unattractive alternative. We predicted that aspiration prices and 
offers would only improve when negotiators focus on having better (but not worse) alternatives.  
Second, focal negotiators in the previous study always opened the negotiation by making 
a first offer, leaving it unclear whether mental simulations also benefit negotiators who receive 
the first offer. This is an important question to examine because the first offer has a particularly 
strong anchoring effect (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001) and can cause negotiators to pay less 
attention to their alternatives when making a counteroffer (Schaerer, Loschelder, & Swaab, 
2016b). Thus, Study 2b tested the robustness and generalizability of the imaginary alternatives 
effect for negotiators who move second in a negotiation. 
Participants and Design 
Three hundred and twenty-four participants (mean age = 34.63; SD = 10.71; 51.9% 
female) were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in exchange for US$.50. Participants were 
randomly assigned to a no alternative condition, an attractive imaginary alternative condition, or 
an unattractive imaginary alternative condition. We excluded twelve participants because they 
took part twice (i.e., duplicate IP addresses; N = 1), failed an attention check (N = 6), or reported 
extreme values (+/- 3SDs, N = 5) for aspirations and/or first offers, leaving 312 observations for 
our analyses.  
Procedure and Experimental Manipulation 
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Participants were instructed to sell an old car and received detailed information about the 
car (color, purchase year, new price, mileage, etc.). All participants were told that they had no 
offer for the car and that they should not expect any money for the car. Specifically, they were 
told that “Unfortunately, you haven't been able to reach an agreement with a buyer so far. Since 
it's been four weeks, you don't think that you will get any money for the car. You will probably 
just hand it over to the dealer to recycle when you pick up your brand new electric car.” To be 
sure that all participants understood that they did not have any alternatives, we asked them to 
indicate whether they reached an agreement with a buyer so far (yes / no). Six participants 
responded incorrectly to the attention check and were dropped from the study (see above).  
Participants then read that just as they decided to give up on looking for a buyer, they 
received a first offer from a buyer who was willing to negotiate. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three conditions. Participants in the no alternative condition received no 
additional instructions, while participants in the two treatment conditions were asked to mentally 
simulate having either an attractive or unattractive alternative. Specifically, participants in the 
attractive imaginary alternative conditions read:  
Imagine yourself in a situation in which you have also secured an attractive alternative offer in 
addition to the one you just received. Imagine what this attractive alternative offer would look 
like, how it would feel like, and how it would affect your upcoming negotiation with the buyer 
who made you an offer. 
Participants in the unattractive imaginary alternative condition received identical 
instructions, except that the word “attractive” was replaced by “unattractive.” 
Dependent Measures 
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Counteroffers and aspiration. Following the manipulation, participants made a 
counteroffer to the buyer and indicated their aspiration price (i.e., the ideal price they would like 
to achieve).  
Manipulation check. To check the effectiveness of the manipulation, participants 
answered the questions “To what extent did you imagine an attractive alternative offer that you 
did not have?” and “To what extent did you imagine an unattractive alternative that you did not 
have?” on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a great extent).   
Finally, participants reported demographic information.  
Results 
Manipulation check. The manipulation was successful. Participants in the attractive 
imaginary alternative condition indicated that they imagined having an attractive alternative offer 
(M = 5.50, SD = 1.33) more than those in the no alternative condition, (M = 3.94, SD = 1.77), 
t(309) = 6.72, p < .001, and more than those in the unattractive imaginary alternative condition, 
(M = 3.51, SD = 2.17), t(309) = 8.34, p < .001. There was also a marginally significant difference 
between the no alternative and unattractive alternative conditions, t(309) = 1.73, p = .084. 
Similarly, participants in the unattractive imaginary alternative condition imagined having 
an unattractive alternative offer to a greater extent (M = 5.17, SD = 1.77) than those in the no 
alternative condition, (M = 4.01, SD = 1.65), t(309) = 5.85, p < .001, and than those in the 
attractive imaginary alternative condition, (M = 2.64, SD = 1.68), t(309) = 10.65, p < .001. The 
no alternative and attractive alternative conditions also differed, t(309) = 4.93, p < .001. 
Aspirations. Replicating Study 2a, negotiators in the attractive imaginary alternatives 
condition set higher aspiration prices (M = 934.33, SD = 584.61) than those in the no alternative 
condition (M = 587.38, SD = 338.11), t(309) = 5.20, p < .001, d = .73. Importantly, imagining 
attractive alternatives also led to higher aspirations than imagining unattractive alternatives (M = 
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597.82, SD = 502.28), t(309) = 4.97, p < .001, d = .62. There was no difference between the no 
alternative and the unattractive alternative conditions (p = .88). 
Counteroffers. Negotiators in the attractive imaginary alternatives condition also made 
more ambitious counteroffers (M = 1,011.78, SD = 552.63) than those in the no alternative 
condition (M = 685.56, SD = 417.24), t(309) = 5.32, p < .001, d = .67, and than those in the 
unattractive imaginary alternatives condition (M = 542.87, SD = 336.56), t(309) = 7.54, p < .001, 
d = 1.02 (see Figure 3). Imagining an unattractive alternative even led to a negative effect 
compared to the no alternative condition, t(309) = 2.31, p = .022, d = .38. 
 
********************* 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
********************* 
 
Mediation analysis. Similar to Study 2a, we tested whether aspirations mediated the 
effect of imaginary alternatives on counteroffers. We estimated the indirect effect of the attractive 
imaginary alternatives condition (1 = attractive imaginary alternatives condition; 0 = all other 
conditions) while controlling for a second indicator (1 = unattractive imaginary alternatives 
condition; 0 = all other conditions).2 Negotiators’ aspiration price mediated the effect of imaging 
strong alternatives on counteroffers. A bootstrapping procedure with 5,000 resamples and a 95% 
bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) confirmed that the indirect 
effect was significant, CI95 [137.74; 327.55] (see Figure 4). 
 
********************* 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
 
********************* 
                                                          
2 There was also a significant indirect effect when the unattractive imaginary alternative condition was dropped and 
only the no alternatives and the attractive imaginary alternative conditions were compared, CI95 [180.75; 388.04].  
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Discussion 
 Study 2b replicates the findings from Study 2a showing that imaginary alternatives cause 
negotiators to demand more from their opponent because they set higher aspirations. Importantly, 
Study 2b also rules out the possibility that simply thinking about any alternative can cause this 
effect. Aspirations and counteroffers only increased when negotiators mentally simulated an 
attractive alternative, but not when they simulated an unattractive one. In addition, Study 2b 
establishes the generalizability of the effect by showing that mentally simulating an attractive 
alternative creates the necessary conditions for a distributive advantage – even when second-
moving negotiators are exposed to the strong anchoring forces of their opponent’s first offer. 
Study 3: Negotiation Outcomes  
The purpose of the third study was to replicate the effects on first offers in an interactive 
email negotiation between experienced professionals and to test whether the mental image of a 
better alternative would be sufficient to lead to advantageous negotiation outcomes.    
Participants and design 
Participants were 338 professionals (mean age = 29.79; SD = 2.33; 29.4% female) 
pursuing an Master of Business Administration degree. The negotiation was part of an 
introductory leadership class in the first semester of the program. Participants completed the 
negotiation in dyads as part of their class preparations. The resulting 169 dyads were randomly 
assigned to one of three conditions: strong alternative, no alternative, or imaginary alternative. 
Twenty-one dyads that did not follow the instructions (i.e., first offer order; created additional 
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negotiation issues; N = 17) or reported extreme values (+/- 3SDs, N = 4) for first offers and/or 
final agreements were excluded, leaving 148 dyads for the analyses.3 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to the role of a job candidate or a recruiter in a 
single-issue negotiation of a bonus payment (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Both parties were 
told that they had already agreed on most terms of the job offer (salary, starting date, benefits), 
but that the signing bonus was yet to be discussed. Participants had five days to complete the 
negotiation over email and were allowed to exchange as many emails as they wanted to.  
Experimental Manipulation 
Participants in the candidate role were randomly assigned to the three alternatives 
conditions. Candidates in the strong alternative condition were told that they had secured a job 
offer at a comparable firm with a signing bonus of €20,000. Candidates in the no alternatives 
condition were told that they had secured a job offer at a comparable firm but without a signing 
bonus. Candidates in the imaginary alternative condition read the same information as those in 
the no alternative condition but were also instructed to complete a mental exercise:  
Imagine yourself in a situation in which you have already secured another, 
comparable job offer with a very high bonus from another company before 
entering the current bonus negotiation. Imagine what this strong alternative job 
offer would look like, how it would make you feel, and how it would affect your 
upcoming bonus negotiation. 
Participants in both roles (recruiter and candidate) were told that bonuses averaged €12,000 
in the past. Recruiters were instructed that they should pay as little as possible and that they 
would prefer to hire another candidate if they cannot settle on a bonus less than €30,000.  
                                                          
3 When all dyads were analyzed, first offers (p = .045) and outcomes (p = .055) in the imaginary alternative condition 
were still higher than in the no alternative condition.  
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Candidates always opened the negotiation with a first offer for the bonus to the recruiter.  
Dependent Measures 
Upon completion of the negotiation, dyads reported their first offers and negotiation 
outcomes to the course assistant.  
Results 
Impasses. Of the 148 dyads, seventeen dyads did not reach an agreement, 8 dyads were in 
the strong alternative condition, 4 in the no alternative condition, and 5 in the imaginary 
alternative condition. These differences were not significant, χ2(2, N = 148) = 1.30, p = .52. 
Because participants were given different alternatives across conditions, dyads who reached an 
impasse were excluded from the analyses (Tripp & Sondak, 1992).  
First offer. As predicted, candidates in the imaginary alternatives condition made higher 
first offers (M = 26,995, SD = 15,925) than those in the no alternative condition (M = 20,937, SD 
= 10,228), t(128) = 2.40, p = .018, d = .47 (see Figure 5). Those with a strong alternative (M = 
31,744, SD = 7,868) made slightly higher first offers than those in the imaginary alternatives 
condition, t(128) = 1.88, p = .063, d = .38, and significantly higher first offers than those in the no 
alternatives condition, t(128) = 4.30, p < .001, d = 1.19.
4 
Final agreement. We hypothesized similar patterns for final agreements and the results 
supported these predictions (see Figure 5). Candidates in the imaginary alternatives condition 
negotiated higher bonuses (M = 17,941, SD = 5,594) than candidates in the no alternative 
condition (M = 15,744, SD = 4,953), t(128) = 2.05, p = .046, d = .42. Those with a strong 
alternative (M = 21,687, SD = 4,390) made higher first offers than those in the imaginary 
                                                          
4 Because first offer values could still be recorded in the case of an impasse, we also re-ran the analyses including 
dyads with an impasse. Those who imagined to have an alternative made higher first offers than those who had no 
alternative, t(145) = 2.30, p = .023, d = .41. Also, those with a strong alternative made marginally higher first offers 
than those in the imaginary alternatives condition, t(145) = 1.83, p = .069, d = .35, and significantly higher first offers 
than those in the no alternatives condition, t(145) = 4.18, p < .001, d = 1.06.  
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alternatives condition, t(128) = 3.49, p = .001, d = .75, and higher first offers than those in the no 
alternatives condition, t(128) = 5.58, p < .001, d = 1.27. 
 
********************* 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
 
********************* 
 
Mediation analysis. To test whether first offers mediated the effect of imaginary 
alternatives on final agreements, we ran a similar analysis as in the previous two studies and  
tested the indirect effect for the imaginary alternatives condition (1 = imaginary alternative 
condition; 0 = all other conditions) while controlling for a second indicator (1 = strong alternative 
condition; 0 = all other conditions).5 Candidates’ first-offer amount mediated the effect of the 
imaginary alternatives manipulation on final agreements. A bootstrapping procedure with 5,000 
resamples and a 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) 
confirmed a significant indirect effect, CI95 [222.96; 2,859.23] (see Figure 6). 
 
********************* 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
 
********************* 
 
Discussion 
Study 3 shows that an experimental manipulation of imaginary alternatives also improves 
negotiation outcomes. Mentally simulating alternatives led job candidates to make more 
ambitious bonus offers and, as a result, achieve more attractive job offers. Together, Studies 1‒3 
provide consistent evidence for our prediction that imagining alternatives can help negotiators 
overcome a lack of structural power. Negotiators who imagined having attractive alternatives set 
                                                          
5 There was also a significant indirect effect when the strong alternatives condition was simply dropped and only the 
no alternatives and the imaginary alternatives conditions were compared, CI95 [223.71; 2,886.62].  
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higher aspirations, made more extreme first offers (Studies 2a, 2b, and 3) and claimed more value 
from the negotiation (Studies 1 and 3). The final two studies were designed to simulate a more 
realistic experience of not having negotiation alternatives (Study 4) and to examine whether 
mentally simulating alternatives can also backfire (Study 5). 
Study 4: Sequential Negotiations 
The goal of Study 4 was to provide a more conservative test of our hypothesis that 
imagining alternatives leads negotiators to demand more when they lack actual alternatives. The 
previous studies all embedded information about negotiators’ alternatives in their role 
instructions, which may evoke a weaker experience of powerlessness than actually lacking an 
alternative. To increase the external validity of our findings, Study 4 had negotiators complete 
two subsequent negotiations where the outcome of the first negotiation served as participants’ 
alternative (or lack thereof). To do so, negotiators first received an offer from another negotiator 
(strong alternative condition) or not (no alternative and imaginary alternative conditions). All 
participants then completed another negotiation and participants in the imaginary alternative 
condition mentally simulated having an alternative before starting this second negotiation. We 
predicted that negotiators who imagine alternatives would reach more profitable agreements than 
those who do not and that this process is mediated by more ambitious first offers.  
Participants and Design 
Participants were 154 individuals (mean age = 34.21; SD = 9.37; 48.1% female) recruited 
on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in exchange for US$1.50. Participants were randomly assigned to 
a strong alternative condition, a no alternative condition, and an imaginary alternative condition. 
We excluded duplicate IP addresses (N = 1), extreme values for first offers and outcomes (+/- 
3SDs; N = 2), and participants who indicated that the (simulated) negotiation counterparts were 
not real people (N = 2), resulting in a final sample of 149 participants.  
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Procedure and Experimental Manipulation 
The study was advertised as an interactive negotiation with other participants. At the start 
of the study, participants entered a simulated waiting room where a counter indicated the number 
of participants who were presumably waiting for the study to begin. After about 30 seconds the 
counter indicated that 20 participants had arrived in the waiting room at which point the 
participants proceeded to the following page where they read their role instructions. Participants 
were informed that they would conduct several rounds of negotiations with other participants and 
entered a screen name that ostensibly would be shown to their negotiation partners. They then 
entered another waiting room, where they were matched with their first opponent and randomly 
assigned to the seller or buyer role (in reality, all participants assumed the role of the seller).  
Participants then received seller-specific information. They were told that their task was to 
sell a “Starbucks© Logo Mug”, that the average market price for such mugs was approximately 
$5, and that in each round they could decide between making a counteroffer or leaving the 
negotiation by accepting the opponent’s current offer. The system then ostensibly selected either 
them or their opponent to make an initial offer. In reality, the simulated opponent always made 
the opening offer. In the strong alternative condition, opponents offered $8 for their mug, along 
with the following message: “hey. I’m interested in your mug and my offer for it is $8.00. I’m 
unable to pay more than $8.00. this is my final offer – take it or leave it!” In the no alternative 
condition and the imaginary alternative condition, the simulated opponent made no offer: “hey. 
Unfortunately, I am unable to make you an offer for your mug. sorry!”  
Participants were then told that the first negotiation had ended and that they would be 
randomly matched with a different opponent for their second negotiation. This time, all 
participants were “randomly” selected to make the first offer. Before making a first offer, 
participants in the imaginary alternative condition were instructed to imagine having an attractive 
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alternative. Thereafter, all participants made a first offer to the simulated opponent. The 
negotiation opponent then made a counteroffer at a pre-determined percentage of the participant’s 
first offer. The participant could then choose to accept this offer or make a counteroffer. The 
negotiation opponent was programmed such that there would be a maximum of 10 negotiation 
rounds (including one offer and counteroffer).6 The counteroffer schedule also left open the 
possibility for negotiators to reach an impasse (six negotiations indeed ended with no agreement). 
The negotiation ended when a) a participant accepted the simulated opponent’s offer, b) a 
participant’s offer was lower than the simulated opponent’s pre-programmed offer in the next 
round, or c) after no offer had been accepted after 10 rounds.  
After the negotiation, participants reported their final agreements and completed a 
suspicion check. For each of the two negotiation partners they were asked what their overall 
impressions of their opponents were. Our simulated negotiation setting was experienced as 
realistic because only two participants mentioned that one or more of their opponents were not 
real. Finally, participants reported demographic information and were debriefed.  
Results 
Impasses. Six of the 149 participants did not reach an agreement; four in the strong 
alternative condition, one in the no alternative condition, and one in the imaginary alternative 
condition. Impasses did not significantly differ across conditions, χ2(2, N = 149) = 3.23, p = .20.  
First offer. As predicted, candidates in the imaginary alternatives condition made higher 
first offers (M = 8.27, SD = 5.62) than those in the no alternative condition (M = 6.56, SD = 
2.21), t(140) = 2.40, p = .018, d = .41. Those with a strong alternative (M = 9.70, SD = 1.03) 
made marginally higher first offers than those in the imaginary alternatives condition, t(140) = 
                                                          
6 The counteroffer by the simulated opponent followed a logarithmic schedule with the first counteroffer reflecting 
50 percent of the participant’s first offer and the opponent’s last (i.e., 10th) counteroffer reflecting 90 percent of the 
participant’s first offer. The logarithmic counteroffer factor (.50, .62, .69…, .90) automatically rounded to the next 
tenth of a dollar (e.g., $9.46 was rounded to $9.50) to prevent suspicions that offers were calculated by a computer.  
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1.95, p = .054, d = .35, and significantly higher first offers than those in the no alternatives 
condition, t(140) = 4.36, p < .001, d = 1.79.
7 
Final agreement. As predicted, sellers in the imaginary alternatives condition negotiated 
better agreements (M = 5.44, SD = 3.57) than sellers in the no alternative condition (M = 4.34, SD 
= 1.70), t(140) = 2.26, p = .026, d = .40. Those with a strong alternative (M = 7.30, SD = 1.32) 
made higher first offers than those in the imaginary alternatives condition, t(140) = 3.72, p < 
.001, d = .69, and significantly higher first offers than those in the no alternatives condition, 
t(140) = 6.03, p < .001, d = 1.93 (Figure 7). 
 
********************* 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
 
********************* 
 
 
Mediation analysis. We applied the same indicator coding procedure as in Study 3 to test 
whether first offers mediated the effect of imaging alternatives on final agreements. As predicted, 
the amount of the first offer made by the seller mediated the effect of imaginary alternatives on 
final agreements. A bootstrapping procedure with 5,000 resamples confirmed a significant 
indirect effect, CI95 [.2128; 4.060] (see Figure 8).
8 
 
********************* 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
 
********************* 
 
                                                          
7 These patterns did not change when we included impasse dyads. Those who imagined to have an alternative made 
higher first offers than those who had no alternative, t(146) = 2.42, p = .017, d = .40. Also, those with a strong 
alternative made higher first offers than those in the imaginary alternatives condition, t(146) = 2.00, p = .047, d = .35, 
and significantly higher first offers than those in the no alternatives condition, t(146) = 4.47, p < .001, d = .74. 
8 There was also a significant indirect effect when the strong alternatives condition was simply dropped and only the 
no alternatives and the imaginary alternatives conditions were compared, CI95 [.1044; 2.249]. 
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Discussion 
 Study 4 replicates the positive effect of imaginary alternatives on first offers and final 
agreements documented in the previous studies in a more realistic context where powerless 
negotiators experienced not having an alternative more vividly. In sum, Studies 1-4 provide 
consistent evidence that mentally imagining having good alternatives is sufficient to significantly 
increase negotiators’ aspirations, their first offers, and the value of their deals.  
Study 5: The Dark Side of Imaginary Alternatives 
 Across four studies we found that mental simulation of strong alternatives can substitute 
for a lack of power and lead to a distributive advantage by increasing negotiators’ aspirations and 
first offers. However, we also predicted that more ambitious negotiation behavior would create a 
roadblock to agreement when the dominant issue in the negotiation is difficult to reconcile for the 
parties involved. To test this final hypothesis, Study 5 examined the impact of imagining 
alternatives on agreement likelihood in a negotiation with a negative bargaining zone.  
Participants and Procedure 
Participants were the same Master of Business Administration students as in Study 1b, but 
assigned to a different negotiation partner and a different interactive, face-to-face negotiation 
task. Sample size (N = 97) and demographic characteristics (mean age = 29.24; SD = 2.19; 33.3% 
female) varied slightly compared to Study 1b due to differences in class attendance. Participants 
were randomly assigned to the role of the buyer or seller in the Les Florets negotiation 
(negotiationexercises.com), which involved the sale of a restaurant. The negotiation made it 
impossible to reach a deal based on sale price alone because it involved a negative bargaining 
zone such that the buyer’s reservation price (the maximum he or she was authorized to pay) was 
lower than the seller’s reservation price (the minimum he or she was willing to accept). Although 
the bargaining zone was negative for the sales price, the two parties actually had a common 
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underlying interest that made agreement possible (but difficult). Specifically, the buyer wanted to 
hire a qualified manager to run the restaurant, and the seller needed a job upon return from a trip 
around the world. Thus, the two parties could agree to a sale price below the seller’s reservation 
price as long as the buyer would provide future employment to the seller. However, reaching this 
deal was challenging because it required participants to discover this alternative solution during 
the negotiation process. Participants were given their confidential role instructions one week 
before the negotiation and were allowed 35 minutes to negotiate a deal in individual breakout 
rooms.  
Measures 
Imaginary alternatives. Our independent variable was the same imaginary alternatives 
scale as in Study 1b.  
Impasses. The dependent variable measured whether negotiators declared an impasse (1) 
or reached a deal within the boundaries of the role instructions (0).  
Control variables. As in Study 1, we controlled for negotiator role, age, and gender. To 
account for within-dyad effects and rule out concerns over non-independence of individual 
observations, we clustered negotiators in their respective dyads and controlled for it using a 
multilevel regression model.  
Results 
We predicted that impasses would be more likely for negotiators who think more strongly 
about better alternatives. Forty-nine out of 78 dyads (or 62.8%) declared an impasse. Because the 
individual negotiators were nested in dyads and the dependent measure was dichotomous, we 
analyzed the data using multi-level General Linear Equations (GLE) model with a binomial 
distribution and logit link. As predicted, we found that impasses were more likely the more 
negotiators’ reported to engage in mental simulation of alternatives, b = .55, SE = .18, Wald(1) = 
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9.49, p = .002 (Model 1, Table 3). This effect remained robust when we controlled for role, age, 
and gender (Model 2, Table 3).  
 
********************* 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
********************* 
 
Discussion 
 Study 5 supports our prediction that mentally simulating better alternatives not only 
facilitates claiming value, but also decreases the likelihood of an agreement when the focal issues 
are difficult to reconcile. When negotiation issues involve a negative bargaining zone, high 
aspirations and offers that result from mental simulations hurt – rather than help. 
Internal meta-analysis 
 To test the robustness of our effects and generate an effect size estimate free of 
publication bias, we conducted a meta-analysis (e.g., Cumming, 2014) of the four experimental 
studies reported in this manuscript and an additional 6 confirmatory studies not included in the 
current version of the manuscript (e.g., studies that were underpowered or tested additional 
moderators). A fixed-effects meta-analysis comparing the average standardized mean difference 
between the baseline condition (no alternative) and the experimental condition (imaginary 
alternative) revealed a significant effect of mental simulation on first offers, k = 10, d = .41, 95% 
CI [.31, .52], Z = 7.83, p < .001, and negotiation outcomes, k = 4, d = .31, 95% CI [.13, .49], Z = 
3.39, p < .001. These findings speak to the robustness of our reported effects and corroborates the 
idea that simulating alternatives enables powerless negotiators to compete more effectively.  
General Discussion 
Practitioners, scholars, and people’s lay perceptions all suggest that negotiators should 
obtain alternatives, because an alternative is the most important source of power in a negotiation. 
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Despite the well-documented benefits of strong alternatives, negotiators are not always able to 
generate these. In fact, negotiators are often unable to obtain strong alternatives, which causes 
them to lower their aspirations (Wong, 2014), decreases their willingness to negotiate (Magee et 
al, 2007), and leads to less profitable agreements (Pinkley et al., 1994). Counter to this 
assumption, we proposed that powerless negotiators are not destined to fail and can still set 
higher aspirations, make more extreme first offers, and reach more profitable agreements when 
they mentally simulate attractive alternatives. 
Across five simulated and interactive negotiations conducted online, via email, and face-
to-face, we found that both measured and manipulated mental simulations of attractive 
alternatives can help negotiators overcome their disadvantaged position. Our studies provide 
compelling evidence for when and why the mental simulation of alternatives is desirable. First, 
we found that negotiators who simulated attractive alternatives more strongly also claimed more 
value in integrative negotiations (Study 1). Second, we found that these mental simulations led to 
higher aspirations and more extreme first offers (Study 2), which mediated the effects on value 
claiming (Studies 3 and 4). Importantly, our final study showed that the aspiration-boosting effect 
of imaginary alternatives could also hurt when negotiators’ positions are already difficult to 
reconcile.  
Theoretical Contributions 
 The present research makes important contributions to the literature on social power (e.g., 
Anderson & Brion, 2014; Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015) by answering a call for more 
research on powerlessness (e.g., Kopelman, Hardin, Myers, & Tost, 2016). Past power studies 
have primarily been concerned with investigating the cognitive, motivational, and behavioral 
implications of being powerful but have neglected to more thoroughly examine the psychology of 
being powerless (Schaerer et al., 2016a). Thus, the present studies extend this research by 
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illuminating the mechanisms that allow powerless individuals to gain power in mixed-motive 
interactions. These findings also align with a growing body of work (e.g., Mishra, Barclay, & 
Lalumière, 2014; Pitesa & Thau, 2013; Zitek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach, 2010) investigating the 
psychological experiences associated with being powerless and identifying ways in which the 
disadvantaged negotiate hierarchical differences. Our studies suggest that mental imagery of what 
it would be like to be in a better position can be a powerful way for powerless individuals to 
compete more effectively. 
In addition, the present research advances our understanding of the influence of 
alternatives on negotiator cognition and behavior. Specifically, it shows that some of the benefits 
that alternatives provide can also be achieved through different means. Research on power and 
negotiations assumes that alternatives are a prerequisite to negotiating successfully (Kim et al., 
2005; Magee et al., 2007; Pinkley, 1995; Pinkley et al., 1994; Thompson et al., 2010). That is, 
actual alternatives are perceived as an instrument that enables negotiators to exercise pressure on 
their opponents and serves as a safety net that protects against a bad deal. Yet, more recent 
research has begun to highlight the dual nature of alternatives: strong alternatives not only 
provide leverage, but also serve as salient anchors that cause negotiators to make more ambitious 
first offers (Schaerer et al., 2015). Thus, alternatives offer both power and cognitive benefits. 
According to this logic, negotiators need not have actual alternatives to reap the cognitive 
benefits that strong alternatives provide. The present studies are consistent with this insight by 
showing that negotiators can generate their own ambitious aspiration prices through mental 
simulations, which eventually translate into higher offers and more profitable agreements when 
negotiators’ interests overlap. Thus, negotiators can act powerfully without having power.  
 The present research also contributes to the existing theoretical literature on the social 
psychology of mental simulations in competitive interactions. First, our findings extend the 
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functional view of counterfactual thinking (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 2008) by providing a clear 
example of how counterfactual thoughts increase economic gains in mixed-motive interactions. 
We also extend research on the link between counterfactuals and negotiation behavior (Kray, 
Galinsky, & Markman, 2009), which has contrasted the relative strength of different types of 
counterfactual thinking (i.e., additive vs. subtractive counterfactuals) by examining reflections 
about past negotiation. However, this research did not show whether mental imagery could result 
in economic advantages over baseline participants. The present studies show that it does. Second, 
our research establishes a novel mechanism through which mental simulations affect 
negotiations. Prior research has primarily argued that counterfactual reflections allow negotiators 
to learn from their past experiences and negotiate more effectively as a result (Kray et al., 2009; 
Wong et al., 2012). The current studies extend these findings by uncovering a cognitive, 
aspiration-based route through which counterfactual thoughts influence outcomes. In addition, 
our studies also show that counterfactual thoughts are an antecedent of first offer extremity. This 
is an important contribution to research on first offers in negotiations which has focused 
predominantly on their consequences rather than its antecedents (see also Schaerer et al., 2016b). 
Finally, the present studies are the first to show that mental simulation can backfire in mixed-
motive interactions. When the situation makes it hard for negotiators to reconcile their 
preferences and positional behavior may not prove useful as a primary strategy, mental imagery 
may pose a roadblock to agreement. This finding qualifies prior research that has established a 
positive link between counterfactual thoughts and value creation (Wong et al., 2012).  
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions 
The present research has a number of strengths. First, in examining the influence of 
imaginary alternatives on negotiator cognition, behavior, and outcomes, we systematically 
replicated our effect across different scenario studies, laboratory experiments, and negotiations 
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between experienced professionals. This not only enabled us to establish the existence of the 
effect, but also allowed us to demonstrate the generalizability of the distributive advantages 
mental simulations can have. Second, we conducted an internal meta-analysis including the file-
drawer to provide both a more precise (i.e., narrower confidence intervals) and a more accurate 
(i.e., free of publication bias) estimate of the effect. In doing so, we not only demonstrate the 
robustness of our findings but also respond to a call for more meta-analytic research and 
unlocking the file-drawer (Cumming, 2014; Franco, Malhotra, & Simonovits, 2014) to provide 
more conservative effect size estimates (Ioannidis, 2008). Third, we go beyond prior negotiation 
research by manipulating the presence of alternatives through a sequential study design in which 
a first negotiation outcome serves as the power manipulation for a second negotiation rather than 
providing this information through artificial point systems or reservation prices presented in the 
task materials (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Pinkley, 1995; Pinkley et al., 1994). We show that 
the benefits of imaginary alternatives hold when a more externally valid and vivid manipulation 
of power(lessness) is used.  
The current research also has limitations that provide exciting opportunities for future 
research. First, a potential downside of boosting one’s aspirations through mentally simulating 
attractive alternatives could be that it ultimately lowers satisfaction with the negotiation outcome. 
Evaluations are often contrastive (Kahneman, 1992) and so whether a particular outcome is 
perceived as a gain or loss depends on a reference point’s relative position. Individuals who 
compare their outcomes to a low reference point tend to be more satisfied than those who 
compare their outcome to a high reference point (Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 2002; 
Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; Medvec & Savitsky, 1997). Thus, negotiators who mentally 
simulate aspirational alternatives may end up feeling less satisfied about a financially better 
outcome. Since negotiators tend to care strongly about both objective and subjective outcomes 
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(Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006), future research could investigate whether negotiators would 
prefer an objectively better but dissatisfying outcome over an objectively less attractive but more 
satisfying outcome, and how this would affect their propensity to engage in mental simulation. 
Second, although Study 3 was conducted with a culturally diverse sample of MBA 
students, we could not systematically examine whether the effects of imaginary alternatives 
would generalize across cultures. Power has been shown to have diverging effects on people from 
different cultures (Zhong, Magee, Maddux, & Galinsky, 2006). Similarly, the timing and function 
of first offers also changes across different cultural contexts. For example, one study found that 
Japanese negotiators tend to make a first offer much earlier than negotiators from the United 
States (Adair, Weingart, & Brett, 2007), which could render mental simulation of alternatives 
even more effective for Japanese negotiators. On the other hand, the same study also found that 
Japanese negotiators tend to share less information before making a first offer than Americans, 
which could make them also more susceptible to reaching an impasse when reconciliation is only 
possible through the exchange of information. Testing this and related predictions concerning the 
role of culture offer potentially worthwhile opportunities for future research. 
Conclusion 
Although there is little doubt that strong alternatives are key to bargaining success, more 
often than not, negotiators come to the negotiation table without an alternative. The studies 
reported here, however, suggest that the mental imagery of an attractive alternative can afford 
negotiators a distributive advantage and compensate for this lack of power. Mental simulation 
proved to be a subtle way for negotiators to escape their powerless situations when there was 
room for more ambitious offers to translate into more profitable agreements. 
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Table 1 
 
Convergent and discriminant validity of Imaginary Alternatives Scale. 
 
Predictor r (zero-order 
correlation) 
Maximization .26** 
 
Sense of Power .06 
 
Optimism -.10 
Big 5 Personality Dimensions 
     Extraversion 
     Emotional stability 
     Openness to experience 
     Agreeableness 
     Conscientiousness 
 
.13 
.02 
.05 
-.01 
-.06 
 
                                             N = 100. * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
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Table 2 
 
Multilevel general linear model predicting overall negotiation outcomes and points achieved 
by issue type. 
 
Dependent 
variable:  
Overall outcome 
(z-scored points) 
 Distributive issues 
(z-scored points) 
 Integrative issues 
(z-scored points) 
 Compatible issues 
(z-scored points) 
 (1) 
Baseline 
 
(2) 
Incl. 
controls 
 (3) 
Baseline 
 
(4) 
Incl. 
controls 
 (5) 
Baseline 
 
(6) 
Incl. 
controls 
 (7) 
Baseline 
 
(8) 
Incl. 
controls 
Imaginary 
alternatives  
.24* 
(.10) 
.21* 
(.09) 
 .16* 
(.06) 
.14* 
(.06) 
 -.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
 .10 
(.07) 
.09 
(.06) 
Role  .32 
(.24) 
  .09 
(.18) 
  .04 
(.03) 
  .12 
(.16) 
Age  .02 
(.04) 
  .01 
(.03) 
  -.00 
(.01) 
  .01 
(.02) 
Gender  .04 
(.24) 
  .01 
(.15) 
  -.06 
(.04) 
  .10 
(.15) 
Intercept -1.16* 
(.48) 
-1.61 
(1.38) 
 -.77* 
(.32) 
-1.01 
(.81) 
 .01 
(.06) 
.03 
(.19) 
 -.47 
(.38) 
-.80 
(.74) 
Observations 91 89  72 71  72 71  72 71 
QICC 87.68 89.95  26.74 31.66  5.29 11.19  37.74 43.35 
 
Note.  General linear model with nested dyads, normal distribution, and identity link. Regression 
coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The number of observations 
is lower in Models 2-8 due to missing values. A smaller QICC score indicates a better goodness of fit. 
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
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Table 3 
 
Multilevel general linear model predicting impasses. 
 
Dependent variable:  
Impasses 
Baseline 
 
(Model 1) 
Including 
controls 
(Model 2) 
Imaginary alternatives  .55** 
(.18) 
.56** 
(.20) 
Role  
 
-.02 
(.25) 
Age  .20 
(.13) 
Gender  -.09 
(.40) 
Intercept -1.84* 
(.89) 
-7.75 
(4.01) 
Observations 97 93 
QICC 118.56 117.18 
 
Note.  General linear model with nested dyads, binomial distribution, and logit link. Regression 
coefficients are unstandardized. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The number of 
observations is lower in Model 2 due to missing values for the control variables. A smaller QICC 
score indicates a better goodness of fit. * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
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Figure 1 
Negotiators in the imaginary alternative condition made higher first offers than those in the 
no alternative condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 SEM. 
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Figure 2 
 
Aspiration price mediated the relationship between the imaginary alternatives manipulation 
and first offers. Regression coefficients are unstandardized and SEs in parentheses. * p < .05, 
** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Figure 3 
Negotiators in the attractive imaginary alternative condition made higher counteroffers than 
those in the no alternative condition. Imagining unattractive alternatives yielded no benefits. 
Error bars indicate ± 1 SEM.  
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Figure 4 
 
Aspiration price mediated the relationship between the attractive imaginary alternatives 
manipulation and counteroffers. Regression coefficients are unstandardized and SEs in 
parentheses. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Figure 5 
Candidates in the imaginary alternatives condition made higher first offers (top panel) and 
reached better agreements (bottom panel) than those in the no alternatives condition. Error 
bars indicate ± 1 SEM. 
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Figure 6 
 
First offer size mediated the relationship between the imaginary alternatives manipulation 
and final agreements. Regression coefficients are unstandardized and SEs in parentheses. * p 
< .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Figure 7 
Sellers in the imaginary alternatives condition made higher first offers (top panel) and 
reached better agreements (bottom panel) than those in the no alternatives condition. Error 
bars indicate ± 1 SEM. 
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Figure 8 
 
First offer size mediated the relationship between the imaginary alternatives manipulation 
and final agreements. Regression coefficients are unstandardized and SEs in parentheses. * p 
< .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Appendix A 
Scoring scheme used in Study 1 
 
Source: Neale (1997)
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Appendix B 
Imaginary Alternatives Scale 
Think about how you usually negotiate and how you tend to behave during such situations. 
By negotiation, we mean situations in which you try to resolve opposing interests and come to 
an agreement with another person. (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) 
1. When I negotiate, I think about what it would be like to have a better offer. 
2. When I negotiate, I dream about alternatives that I don’t have. 
3. When I negotiate, I try to picture how it would feel like to have a strong alternative. 
4. When I negotiate, I think about what it would be like to be in a stronger position. 
5. When I negotiate, I visualize alternatives that I don't currently have. 
 
